Draft 5-21-06

Forthcoming 35 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics ___ (2006)

Human Genetics Studies: The Case for Group Rights
Laura S. Underkuffler

I. Introduction

During the past twenty years, the importance of human genetic information has exploded.
Whether sought for medical treatment, disease prediction studies, cultural studies, or the general
study of human origins, human genetic information is now viewed as crucial for scientific
research and general attempts at human understanding.
With the importance of genetic information has come bitter battles over its control. The
demonstrated power of human genetic information has moved the issue of its “ownership” from
the realm of musty academic musings to protracted political and legal battles among “source”
individuals, researchers, commercial concerns, government agencies, and others. Whether
collected through targeted scientific studies,1 “discarded” biological tissue,2 initial charitable
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See, e.g., J. Barker, “The Human Genome Diversity Project: ‘Peoples’, ‘populations’,
and the cultural politics of identification,” Cultural Studies 8 (2004): 571-606, at 595 (discussing
studies).
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See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
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bequest,3 or other means, genetic information and the biological materials in which it is
contained have become the subject of protracted legal battles for control and intense social and
ethical controversy.
In these battles, some principles have emerged that are beyond dispute. Most
fundamentally, the ability of individuals to control the disposition and genetic testing of their
own biological materials is (as a matter of theory, at least) beyond question. No one would
argue today that an individual could be subject to genetic testing for studies against her will, or
that biological samples obtained from individuals under specified conditions could be simply
deemed “free” of such conditions by researchers. Although difficult problems remain in the
interpretation of research agreements, the circumstances under which “informed consent” was
given, and so on, the general principle that individuals have a right to control the genetic testing
of their own biological materials is assumed by ethicists, medical researchers, and others. It is
also assumed (through contract, property, and privacy theories) by law.
Far more contested is the idea of group control over the collection, testing, and
disposition of the biological materials of its members. When – for instance – isolated indigenous
populations are chosen for genetic study in an effort to “grasp ... human origins, evolution,
prehistory, and potential,”4 or patented cell lines are made from blood samples collected from
indigenous peoples,5 affected groups have demanded control of such projects citing an invasion
3

See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla.
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Vanishing Opportunity for the Human Genome Project,” Genomics 11 (1991): 490-491, at 491.
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of sovereignty, lack of informed consent, and moral grounds.6 However, group demands for
effective control or “veto power” have, however, been met with skepticism or outright rejection
by many researchers, ethicists, and legal scholars.7 The stated reasons for this response are
multifarious, and include representational conundrums (who is “the group”?),8 practical
problems (how do we handle “dispersed communities”?),9 ethical questions,10 and resource
issues.11

In addition, when the demanding groups are indigenous peoples, acknowledging

of the legal and ethical issues involved in such patenting projects, see L. Demaine and A.
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D.C.: National Academy Press,1997), at . For a different view, see H. Greely, “Genes, Patents,
and Indigenous Peoples: Biomedical Research and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Cultural
Survival Quarterly 20 (1996): 54-59, at 57 (advocating an approach under which “the decision
whether and what terms a population will participate in genetic research belongs to the group”).
8

See, e.g., Juengst, supra note 7, at 187 (contrasting genetic populations and “selfidentified, morally authoritative social groups”); R. Sharp and M. Foster, “Involving Study
Populations in the Review of Genetic Research,” The Journal of Law, Wedicine and Ethics 28
(2000): 41-51, at 47 (describing the problem of the “nesting” of local and larger communities).
9

See, e.g., Sharp and Foster, supra note 8, at 47-48.

10
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group rights implicates larger debates and demands of indigenous peoples for rights to
governance, territorial integrity, cultural autonomy, and other incidents of self-determination.12
In this essay, I wish to focus on an underlying theoretical issue which I believe seriously
affects our collective response to the idea of group rights in the genetic-control context. That
issue is this. To what extent are our responses to claims of group rights hampered by our
bringing to the table (consciously or unconsciously) a model which is structured to acknowledge
only individual concerns? Put another way, to what extent are our objections to group rights in
this context a product of our inability (or refusal) to imagine the idea of group rights, rather than
the product of truly substantive concerns?
This underlying issue of conceptualization is manifest in the responses of many
commentators to the idea of group genetic-control rights. Consider, for instance, the following
observation by Eric Juengst, a leading commentator in the field. “[Some] argue,” he writes, “that
groups, once targeted for ... study, should be given the opportunity to decline participation on
behalf of their members by being asked in advance for permission to contact and recruit
individuals from their membership ... .” “These proposals have vast practical and ethical
implications. If groups have interests that require protections like those of individual subjects, a
layer of research arrangements would be necessary that our individually-oriented biomedical
research ethic is ill-prepared to define or delimit.”13
Juengst may well be right that there are significant psychological barriers to the idea of
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See Barker, supra note 1, at 580 (such scientific projects involve confrontation “of
indigenous rights to sovereignty and self-determination within the legal and scientific realms of
law, policy, and protocol”).
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Juengst, supra note 7, at 184 (footnotes omitted).
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group genetic-control rights. However, in this essay I shall argue that the notion that group
control of genetic testing and use is incompatible with contemporary notions of legal rights is
greatly exaggerated. Group control is, in fact, a natural implementation of many existing legal
theories and is viewed in many contexts as an enforceable legal right. Although there may be
valid objections to particular instances of group control of genetic testing and use, there is no
generally valid objection, as a matter of theory, to the implementation of this right. Wholesale
objections are, thus, more a product of unexamined bias than considered reasons for the rejection
of this right.

II. Groups as Rights-Holders: General Arguments

Contemporary Western jurisprudence is replete with broad, philosophical statements that
identify individual rights as the appropriate foundation for protection of human rights and
liberties. Rooted in natural rights theories, social compact theories, Kantian notions of the
individual, and other philosophical antecedents, it is generally assumed by liberal democratic
governments that legally cognizable human rights are individual rights, which stand against the
potential tyranny of government.14 Group rights, collective rights, or societal rights are simply
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See, e.g., A. Buchanan, “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics
99 (1989): 852-882, at 854; G. Walker, “The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism,” in I. Shapiro
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ignored in the American Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and other watershed
documents as a protected source or expression of human rights as either a philosophical or
operative matter.15
In the day-to-day workings of American jurisprudence, expressed fidelity to this principle
is strong. Individual rights are assumed, for both positive and negative reasons,16 to be the
building blocks for legal rights and legal responsibilities. Legal interests, whether asserted in
tort, contract, constitutional law, or otherwise, are immediately and reflexively envisioned in
individual terms. Whether we are speaking of private wrongs or wrongs by government, it is
generally assumed in American jurisprudence that it is the individual who is the focus of
concern.17 Group rights, which are experienced and exercised with others, are generally ignored
requir[ing] [their] protection and expression in appropriate institutional forms.”).
15

The absence of different conceptions of rights in Western jurisprudence is, of course,
not always simply the result of philosophical oversight; often, those with power and influence
have been keenly aware of the claims of groups and have deliberately eclipsed their interests.
For instance, the omission of group rights in early United Nations documents was the product of
a belief that political troublesome minorities in member states should not be given legal status
and recognition. See O. Goldman, “The Need for an Independent International Mechanism to
Protect Group Rights: A Case Study of the Kurds,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law 2 (1994): 45-89, at 51-53; J. Robinson, “International Protection of
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In a typical statement of this view, a prominent scholar argued:

[C]ivil rights – fundamentally the rights of citizenship, of a member of the polity ... –
inhere in individuals, not in groups. ... That is a fundamental principle of democracy. It
is explicit in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution (perhaps especially in the
Bill of Rights) and in the major civil rights legislation over the decades.
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as a jurisprudential category.18
Upon deeper reflection, of course, this assumed anti-group bias in Western jurisprudence
is fraught with theoretical and practical weaknesses. For instance, whether groups
(“collectivities”) can possess moral rights has been the subject of extensive scholarly
commentary. If one begins with the proposition that all moral value is rooted in the well-being
of individual human beings, then the idea that moral rights “can inhere in collectivities as such”
is obviously untenable.19 If – on the other hand – one accepts the moral value of distinctly
collective interests, the idea of morally grounded group rights follows.20 Group rights, in this
view, are intended to protect distinctly collective interests, such as larger societal recognition and

A Bill to Amend the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to Extend the Life of the Commission on Civil
Rights, and for Other Purposes, 1983: Hearings on S. 1189 before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) (statement of
Chester E. Finn, Jr., Professor of Education and Public Policy, Vanderbilt University).
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See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
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See M. Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights,” Canadian Journal
of Law and Jurisprudence 4 (1991): 293-314, at 312. See also Buchanan, supra note 14.
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As Michael McDonald writes:

What the liberal takes as basic and unquestionable is the idea that the individual is the
measure of everything; hence, the liberal believes that correct normative principles treat
the individual as the fundamental unit of value ... . Individuals are regarded as valuable
because they are choosers and have interests. But so also do communities make choices
and have values. Why not then treat communities as fundamental units of value ...?
M. McDonald, “Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism,”
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4 (1991): 217-237, at 237. See also D. Réaume,
“Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods,” University of Toronto Law Journal 38
(1988): 1, at 13-17, 24; R. Garet, “Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups,”
Southern California Law Review 56 (1983): 1001-1075.
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respect for the group’s decision-making mechanisms, rights, and powers.21
From the point of view of what rights do, there is no structural reason why legal rights –
which guarantee particular states of affairs, in law – cannot be afforded to groups as well as to
individuals.22 Indeed, the idea that Western jurisprudence abjures [shuns] group rights is, itself,
an obvious conceptual fallacy. In international law, governments – which recognize and enforce
individual rights – are themselves groups with recognized legal status. In addition, groups of all
kinds are recognized in a myriad of circumstances. Binding international agreements and nonbinding international declarations recognize group rights in the contexts of cultural property,23
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See McDonald, supra note 20, at 218, 220.
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See, e.g., V. Amar and A. Brownstein, “The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights,”
Stanford Law Review 50 (1998): 915-1014; L. Rodriguez-Abascal, “On the Admissibility of
Group Rights,” American Survey of International and Comparative Law 9 (2003): 101-110, at
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(recognizing cultural property rights of nations and other groups).
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education,24 religion,25 and genocide.26 National, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities,27 as
well as indigenous peoples,28 are afforded group rights.29
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See, e.g., Convention Against Discrimination in Education, art. 5, Dec. 14, 1960, 429
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1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; D. Alonzo-Maizlish, “In Whole or in Part: Group Rights, the Intent
Element of Genocide, and the ‘Quantitative Criterion,’” New York University Law Review 77
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See, e.g., Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Counties, International Labour Conference, June 27, 1989, available at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm> (last visited May 19, 2006) (recognizing the
rights of indigenous populations and the need to preserve their institutions, persons, property,
and labor); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub. Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, art. 29, in Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56/Annex to Res. 45 (Oct.
28, 1994) (indigenous peoples “have the right to special measures to control, develop, and
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International Law Proceedings 93 (1999): 251-260, at 251. See also S. Wiessner, “Rights and
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Human Rights Journal 12 (1999): 57-128.
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For a general discussion of guarantees of group rights under international and foreign
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Arizona Law Review 32 (1990): 739-747, at 743-746; Goldman, supra note 15, at 52-65; N.
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9

Within the United States, we routinely recognize the distinct interests and decisionmaking power of groups in law. Lesser political and governmental entities, such as states,
counties, and municipal governments, enjoy unquestioned legal status. Since the time of the
country’s founding, the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized Indian tribes as quasisovereign nations.30 Other non-governmental groups that have enjoyed legal or de facto
recognition of their interests and powers include for-profit and charitable corporations,
unincorporated associations, partnerships, families, labor unions, racial minorities,31 and
religious groups.32 Commitments to freedom of association, freedom of contract, the institution
of marriage, and other Western legal commitments involve -- explicitly or implicitly -- the
recognition of legally binding, group-based rights.33
It is true that the group rights asserted in these examples are quite varied in nature. In
some cases, groups exercise decisionmaking powers as groups, using their own designated
processes (for example, corporations, local governments, religious groups, and Indian tribes). In

Kluwer Law International, 2003).
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The rights of Indian tribes in the United States are grounded in historical documents
that recognize rights of group autonomy, not individual freedoms. See Clinton, supra note 29, at
745.
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See, e.g., O. Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,” Journal of Philosophy and Public
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See T. Pogge, “Group Rights and Ethnicity,” in Ethnicity and Group Rights: Nomos
XXXIX, supra note 14: 187-221, at 196-197 .
10

other cases, “group” status confers far less (for instance, the simple acknowledgment of
perceived group needs in affirmative action efforts and laws protecting cultural property).34 The
form of group recognition may have important consequences for the idea of group rights in any
particular context, as discussed below. At this point, it is important to appreciate only that
recognition of group interests, whether based upon territory, culture, ethnicity, or other grounds,
is a routine legal matter; and that the denial of rights based upon these interests requires more
than the simple assertion that group rights are alien to our law. As Thomas Pogge has stated,
“the question therefore cannot be whether we should depart from our ordinary practice of
recognizing only ...rights of individuals ... . There is no such ordinary practice. Group rights ...
are staples of standard Western liberal thought.”35
The question remains whether group rights should be recognized in the context of genetic
information control. It is to that question that we now turn.

III. Groups as Rights-Holders: Genetic Testing and Use

There are many reasons why identifiable groups whose members are the “source” for
genetic testing programs may wish to assert demands for control. Groups may wish to ensure
that they (or their members) reap the health benefits or commercial earnings that their genetic
information yields. They may wish to oppose the idea of genetic testing or commercial

34

Cf. id. at 191-193 (discussing “group rights proper”, “group-specific rights”, and
“group-statistical rights”).
35

Id. at 197.
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exploitation of that testing, on cultural or ethical grounds. They may wish to avoid collective
risks that these projects present to members of a genetically identifiable group. If particular
diseases or disabilities are associated with particular genetic variations, and those variations are
(in turn) associated with particular groups, there is a real risk of group discrimination and
stigmatization.36
Whatever the reasons for its assertion, the idea of group control or “veto power” over
genetic testing and its uses has been vigorously opposed on various grounds. Some of the
reasons for opposition, such as resource questions, are general restraints on any research project
design. Other reasons for opposition challenge the essential premise of group rights and group
control. It is the validity of the latter that we will examine here.

(a) What is a “group”?

(1) Structural challenges

As an abstract matter, the idea of a socially or legally cognizable “group” is very broad
and generally refers to persons who share certain common characteristics or interests.37 These
characteristics or interests may be chosen by the individuals involved (e.g., geographical
residence, cultural adoption, self-identified racial or religious membership) or they may be
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See Sharp and Foster, supra note 8, at 41; A. Caplan, “Handle With Care: Race, Class,
and Genetics,” in T. Murphy and M. Luppé eds., Justice and the Human Genome Project
(Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1994): 30-45, at 30-33.
37

See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 29, at 36.
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involuntarily conferred (e.g., country of birth, biological race, or tribal, religious, or other
membership by parentage).
The fluidity and complexities of group definition has made it an essentially contested
concept.38 Theorists have advanced varying formulae for group recognition in particular
contexts. For instance, Thomas Pogge argues that an “ethnic group” must meet three conditions:
the members of the set must understand themselves as descendants of members of a historical
society (in a broad sense, including tribes, principalities, and others); they must share a common
culture, or partial culture, which they take to be connected, through a continuous history; and the
group must contain all, or nearly all, of the persons who, within the relevant state, are taken to
share the group’s descent and culture.39 Natan Lerner, in an analysis of group recognition in
international law, stresses the purposes and goals of asserted groups,40 the relationship of the
group to other groups,41 the permanence of the group,42 the naturalness or spontaneity of the
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Indeed, as one scholar has noted, even “indigenous peoples” and “indigenous
populations” – which are widely used in international law – are contested terms. Anaya, supra
note 28, at 251.
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Pogge, supra note 33, at 193-194. Other theorists stressing similar factors in group
recognition include A. Addis, “Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities,” Notre Dame Law Review 67 (1992): 615-676, at 656 (citing shared history and
culture); Statement of UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples
(Paris, Feb. 1990), quoted in Goldman, supra note 15, at 48 (citing common historical tradition,
racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity,
territorial connection, and/or common economic life).
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See Lerner, supra note 29, at 36.
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See, e.g., id. at 36, 39.
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See id. at 36-38.
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group,43 and whether group membership is voluntary or involuntary in nature.44 Still other
theorists emphasize shared normative understandings,45 the importance of the group to personal
identity,46 and whether the well-being of group members is at least in part determined by group
well-being.47
All of these criteria involve acknowledged vagueness; for instance, most definitions
require only that the group in question have some (unspecified) number of these characteristics
to qualify for recognized “group” status.48 In addition, there is no specification, in these lists, as
to how broad or narrow the required commonalities must be, or – in the case of shared history or
culture – how long these commonalities must exist in time.49 As Pogge puts it, “[h]ow important
is it for qualifying as a Navajo, for example, what fraction of one’s ancestry is Navajo, whether
one checks off the ‘Native American’ category on affirmative action questionnaires, how much
one knows about Navajo history, culture, and affairs, [or] how one is regarded by other Navajos
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See id.
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See id. Lerner argues that under international law, recognized groups involve factors
that are beyond the control of members; voluntary associations are not recognized. See id. at 3639.
45

See McDonald, supra note 20, at 218.
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See id. at 219; Fiss, supra note 31, at 148. See also Statement of UNESCO Meeting,
supra note 39, quoted in Goldman, supra note 15, at 48 (“‘The group as a whole must have the
will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people – allowing that groups or
some members of such group[s], though sharing [other required] ... characteristics, may not have
the will or consciousness.’”).
47

See Fiss, supra note 31, at 148.
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See, e.g., Statement of UNESCO Meeting, supra note 39, quoted in Goldman, supra
note 15, at 48.
49

See Pogge, supra note 33, at 194-195.
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...?”50 Groups, whether identified by any cluster of the assembled characteristics, often lack
“clear identity” or the presence of reasonably clear boundaries for determining membership,
responsibilities, benefits, and authoritative voice in the group’s affairs.51
In addition, for groups to be recognized social, political, or legal actors, they must have
“effective agency,” or the ability “to form goals, deliberate, choose, intend, act, and carry out
evaluations of actions taken.”52 If (for instance) a group’s consent for genetic testing is required,
there must be some kind of effective mechanism for ascertaining the group’s stand on the matter
and some effective leadership or other structure with whom those seeking permission for the
project can deal.
Finally, there is the problem of “nesting,” on both an individual and group level. On the
individual level, general criteria for “group” status – even if established with great specificity –
may result in multiple and possibly conflicting group memberships for individuals. For instance,
a single individual may (by birth) be a member of particular geographical, religious, and racial
groups, and may (by choice) be a member of groups based upon residence, self-identified
ethnicity, chosen religious identity, and other factors. On the group level, “nesting” will occur
when smaller groups are (by definition) part of larger, more inclusive groups. For instance, as
Richard Sharp and Morris Foster describe, an individual Mohawk community, if located on a
reservation with other Mohawk communities, may be part of a larger, politically defined
50

Id. at 195.
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See J. Nickel, “Group Agency and Group Rights,” in Ethnicity and Group Rights:
Nomos XXXIX , supra note 14: 235-256, at 235.
52

Id. See also Statement of UNESCO Meeting, supra note 39, quoted in Goldman, supra
note 15, at 48 (“Possibly, the group must have institutions or other means of expressing its
common characteristics and will for identity.”).
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community. That larger reservation-based community may consider itself part of a common
Mohawk national community. And the Mohawk nation is, itself, a part of the League of Iroquois
and may be represented, as a political matter, by the National Congress of American Indians.53
On either level, the nesting problem means that individuals and groups may be subject to
conflicting identities and conflicting interests.
The critical question for our inquiry is whether any of these structural issues involving
group identity and function are fatal to the recognition of group genetic-control claims. That the
criteria for group recognition may be uncertain or arbitrary, that questions of agency may exist,
and that individuals and groups may be subject to conflicting group loyalties, will complicate the
idea of group rights to control genetic testing and use of genetic information is beyond question.
However, are these problems fatal to the implementation of this goal?
There may be certain proposed “groups” – for instance, all Irish Americans, or the
world’s Ashkenazi Jewish women – whose numbers are so large, and whose sense of group
cohesion and group decisionmaking are so weak, that the idea of group rights in the genetic
control context is completely unworkable. By and large, however, it is not these groups who are
making genetic-control claims. Rather, it is groups who generally meet some or all of the
recognition criteria set forth above, and who have – by virtue of their assertion of the claim –
some kind of authoritative voice or structure with whom to deal. The question is, what of these
groups?
In considering this question, we must return to the observations about group status in
international and domestic law with which we began. Despite the rhetorical primacy of the
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See Sharp and Foster, supra note 8, at 47.
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individual in Western jurisprudence, group interests, relations, and decision-making structures
are recognized throughout international and domestic law. Local, state, and national political
entities, religious groups, cultural groups, corporate groups, minority groups, indigenous and
tribal groups, and a myriad of others have distinctly recognized and protected interests in law
despite the definitional uncertainties, agency issues, and nesting problems that surround them.54
We simply accept such problems as part of the analytical terrain; we accept, for instance, that
sorting out the conflicting (group) interests surrounding “cultural property” is as manageable as
sorting out the conflicting (individual and group) interests surrounding “due process of law.”
Structural issues of these kinds are not unique to group genetic-control claims; they are involved
in the recognition of all group entities and interests by law. Indeed, in a broader sense, problems
of definitional uncertainties, agency issues, and overlapping or conflicting authority are not
limited to legal treatment of groups; they are an endemic part of any attempt to organize any
human activity in terms of legal rights and powers.
Attempting to honor group claims in the field of genetic research would be undoubtedly
more cumbersome, time-consuming, and perhaps preclusive (of our ends), should groups refuse
particular research proposals, collection methodologies, patents, or uses. However, these are

54

For instance, “there is no uniformly accepted definition [in international law] for a
‘minority’ [group], despite the dominance of its use.” Goldman, supra note 15, at 47 (footnote
omitted). The most widely accepted definition identifies a minority group as “[a] group
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose
members ... possess [distinctive] ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics ..., and show, if
only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions,
religion, or language.” F. Capotorti, “Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.78.XIV.1 (New York: United Nations, 1979), at 96. This obviously leaves many questions
unanswered.
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costs imposed by group control, not structural or analytical impossibilities. Just as we tolerate
and accommodate the societal costs involved in honoring group claims (and other claims) in
other contexts, we can – if we wish – tolerate and accommodate the societal costs involved in
this context as well.

(2) Substantive challenges

Critics have also raised substantive challenges to the ability of particular groups to assert
genetic-control claims. In particular, critics challenge the moral capacity or qualifications of
groups to control the genetic decision-making of their members.
In the genetic-control context, “groups” can be identified in two different ways. First,
one might genetic populations, or “demes”, which are comprised of individuals who share
relevant genetic information. In addition, there are as self-identified or other-identified social
groups or “ethnoi”, whose members are the subject of genetics testing and use.
Objections to group control by demes, or genetic populations, are well summarized by
Eric Juengst. If, he writes, by “groups” “we mean genetic populations, or human ‘demes’, we
are not talking about the kind of human groups that can be approached for permission: they have
no moral standing, deserve none, and in any case are unidentifiable until the research has been
conducted.”55
To examine this argument, let us begin with the question of group pre-research control.
If a particular genetic population cannot be identified (as a scientific or social matter) before the

55

Juengst, supra note 7, at 187.
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research is conducted, then denial of pre-research control to such groups is obviously justified.
A group that cannot be identified, by its “members” or by others, cannot assert a common
interest of any of the kinds that we have identified in this context. The group qua group will
have no group cultural, ethical or other grounds on which to oppose the project, or group
interests in the project’s benefits or profits.
Let us consider, however, a different case: one where the genetic population in question
is certain, or very likely, identifiable before the research is done. In a recent article, Graeme
Laurie discusses the interests of family members in shared familial genetic information.56 He
observes that traditionally, when we have asked where the control of information should lie, the
answer has been “the source.”57 However, “[i]n the genetic sphere, ... such an answer is
simplistic and unsatisfactory.”58 He writes:
[G]enetic information differs from other forms of medical information
because it pertains to a range of people and not solely to one individual. In
this respect, it gives rise to special problems concerning how the
information should be gathered, stored, accessed, and used. ... [O]ne cannot
ignore the fact that genetic information derived from the sample also
reveals information about the relatives of the sample source. These persons
can base a claim to the information on precisely the same grounds as the
source, namely: “I have a claim because it is about me.”59
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G. Laurie, “Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role of Autonomy,
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Id. Diseases for which genetic predispositions have already been identified include
cystic fibrosis, adult onset polycystic kidney disease, Huntington’s chorea, Alzheimer’s disease,
breast cancer, muscular dystrophy, sickle-cell anemia, and others. See D. Peters, “Risk
Classification, Genetic Testing, and Health Care: A Conflict Between Libertarian and Egalitarian
Values?”, in T. Peters ed., Genetics: Issues of Social Justice (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press,
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Indeed, “genetic test results can offer a high degree of specificity, both in terms of predicting the
likelihood of disease in other family members and in terms of putting flesh on the bones of a
suspicion that has heretofore been unconfirmed.”60 Specific information can confer “a degree of
‘certainty’ about future ill health or even the mode and manner of one’s own death.”61 This
information may alter one’s self-perception and create anxiety, depression, and a sense of
stigmatization among all of those who believe themselves to be so identified.62 Family members
may also be the victims of discrimination by third parties, who act on the prejudices and
predictions that this information may arouse.63
The example of family consanguinity illustrates that it is possible for pre-testing,
probable-genetic-similarity alone to identify a group with legitimate and legally cognizable
genetic-control interests.64 The frequency of such groups beyond the family context is a matter

1998): 205-217, at 205; T. Peters, “Genes, Theology, and Social Ethics: Are We Playing God?”,
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See T. Peters, supra note 59, at 4 (footnotes omitted) (“Among Fortune’s 500 top
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anemia, artherosclerosis, Huntington’s disease, Down syndrome, and muscular dystrophy. ...
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20

of question. Evidence to date indicates that almost all human social groups exhibit wide genetic
variation; only human populations that have been physically isolated for a substantial period
show an increase in general genetic homogeneity. The infrequency of genetically identified
groups does not mean, however, that we should dismiss this as a possible category for group
rights. Where a genetically-identified group is present, and is the subject of genetic study, we
should not be free to ignore its interests.
Let us assume, then, that the problem of identifiability has been met, either because the
genetic group is identifiable (with reasonable certainty) before the research commences, or
because the research itself has identified the genetic group, and the question is post-research
control. The objections that Juengst summarizes do not end at this point. Rather, they argue that
the idea of “rights” for human demes is still nonsensical, because such groups “have no moral
standing, deserve none”, and, in any event, have no capacity to exercise the rights that they
might seek.65
These arguments are curious. Why would a group, whose members are bound by genetic
similarity, necessarily fail (and deserve to fail) the test of moral or practical standing? One can
imagine how a group whose members are linked by the presence of a single, identified gene – for
instance, the presence of BRCA 1 in Ashkenazi Jewish women66 – might be too large, and the
visited May 21, 2006) (“private genetic information” subject to the Act’s proposed safeguards
includes “any information about an identifiable individual that is derived from the presence,
absence, alteration, or mutation of a gene or genes, or the presence or absence of a specific DNA
marker or markers, and which has been obtained: (1) from an analysis of the individual’s DNA;
or (2) from an analysis of the DNA of a person to whom the individual is related”).
65

See Juengst, supra note 7, at 187.
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See J. Struewing et. al., “The Risk of Cancer Associated with Specific Mutations of
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 Among Ashkenazi Jews,” The New England Journal of Medicine 336
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shared comonality too small, to forge any true group interest or identity. However, this failure
occurs not because this is a genetic group, per sé, but because it fails to meet the criteria for
“groupness,” in the sense of common interests or other criteria that we have (on some other
basis) previously established.67 There is no a priori reason why genetic groups should be
deemed, in every case, to fail to meet whatever structural requirements we set for group
recognition in this context. Indeed, it is perfectly imaginable that a group, whose members are
bound by genetic ties, would have strong common interests and practical goals – not the least of
which is the avoidance of group discrimination and stigmatization.
Let us move now to groups of the second kind: self-identified or other-identified social
groups or “ethnoi,” whose group identities are rooted in culture, language, race, territorial
occupation, or other characteristics.68 It is these groups (for instance, indigenous peoples, and
geographically or culturally isolated peoples) who are the most common subjects of genetic
research, and who have been the most forceful in asserting genetic-control claims.69
The most obvious objection to the demands of these groups is that they are unacceptable
“surrogates for demes”:70 that is, that their members lack sufficient genetic similarity to give
them standing to assert genetic-control claims. For instance, if the dangers from the project lie
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in the potential stigmatization or discriminatory treatment of persons who are found to carry a
particular genetic variation, these dangers (and the moral rights they create) apply only to those
who share or very likely share the characteristics in question. If the members of a particular
cultural, historical, racial, or other group in fact lack genetic similarity, there is (under this
argument) no reason to afford genetic-control rights to this group.
The answer to this argument inheres in the question that it poses. If we are, in fact,
looking for “surrogates for demes” – in a demonstrable, verified, scientific sense – then no social
group will surely achieve this status. Groups whose membership and authority are based upon
culture, history, ethnicity, territorial proximity, or other factors will at best have possible genetic
similarities – nothing that makes them, with any assurance, “surrogates for demes.”
The “demic certainty” that this objection requires is not, however, what genetic research
of this kind has assumed. For instance, as Juengst has observed, “it is the history, migration, and
relative disease burdens of humanity’s many socially defined groups, not our anonymous demes,
that derives most descriptions and defenses of population-genomics research.”71 Indeed, it seems
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See id. at 190. As Joanne Barker describes the original design of the Human Genome
Diversity Project:
Because of the similarities [among members of] ... populations, [it was
assumed that] the HGDP would only need to collect samples from about 10
percent of the world’s total groups, meaning anywhere between 500-700 of
the estimated 5,000-7,000. The selection of these groups would be
determined by their biological and geotraphical isolation (“isolates of
historic interest”) and linguistic integrity. Because of the genetic
similarities within groups, only about 25 individuals from each would need
to be sampled.
Barker, supra note 1, at 574-575. See also L Cavalli-Sforza et. al., supra note 4, at 490 (target
popoulations are those who “have been isolated for some time, are likely to be linguistically and
culturally distinct, and are often surrounded by geographic boundaries”).
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quite inexplicable to the members of these groups why – if their group status makes them targets
for genetic research – that group status is, in turn, insufficient to allow their assertion of geneticcontrol claims. For instance, if “group status” confers sufficient commonality for targeted
genetic research, then presumably it also confers sufficient commonality for the risk of
stigmatization or discrimination.72
The demand for “demic certainty” is also flawed, in that it narrows too profoundly the
range of interests that groups, in this context, can legitimately assert. If we require “demic
certainty,” we implicitly assume that it is genetic similarity alone that generates cognizable
group interests. In fact, the claims of groups, particularly indigenous, tribal, and territorially
isolated groups, go far beyond those interests. These groups claim a violation of culture. They
claim a disregard of ethics,73 and commercial exploitation.74 They claim a loss of autonomy,
territorial integrity, and governmental respect.75 As explained by Aroha Te Pareake Mead:
[For the Maori and others,] genes and combinations of genes are not the
72
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sole property of individuals. They are part of the heritage of families,
communities, clans, tribes, and entire indigenous nations. ...
....
[As a result,] [t]he HGDP is viewed by many indigenous peoples as
offensive, frivolous, and disrespectful of the integrity of nature, life, the
ancestors – all that is sacred. ...
....
As outsiders, who will the HGDP approach? Who will they consider to
have the definitive vote? ... Can consent be reduced to an individual level
when the very nature of genetic research implicates a wider group?76
Just as cultural, ethical, and governmental concerns are deemed by the majority culture to
be valid and vital interests that justify the power of local and national governments, so those
concerns must be recognized as valid and vital interests of other “social” groups who are the
targets of genetic research and who respond with the assertion of assert genetic-control claims.
The sufficiency of group interests in any setting to establish group rights is, of course, a deep and
complicated inquiry. However, we cannot – on the grounds of “moral capacity” or “standing” –
simply choose to disregard, as a class, the rights of social groups or “ethnoi” to assert geneticcontrol claims.
Finally, the ability of social or cultural groups to control the genetic decision-making of
their members is implicitly challenged by what might be called the “critique of cultural
orthodoxy”.77 Scholars have observed that culture is “a process, or dialogue, through which
individuals continually renegotiate the world and their place in it.”78 Cultural identity is
continually evolving, as a result of both internal dissent and outside challenges. Madhavi Sunder
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argues that the role of cultural dissent is both powerful and unavoidable; it “enhances individual
autonomy and equality within culture, enables cultural ‘outsiders’ to challenge discrimination
without fear of losing their culture, challenges cultural relativist arguments, prevents insularity,
improves relations across cultural groups, and increases diversity.”79
When “cultural survival” is ensconced as a legal norm, there is a tendency to deny the
fluid and contested nature of culture and, instead, to see culture “as a thing that is possessed, or
owned, by a largely homogenous and discrete, or bounded, group.”80 In particular, legal
recognition of the “preservation of culture” tends to “do more than offer a means for cultural
communities to regain a degree of control over their community and expressions.”81 Legally
enforced cultural boundaries may work to enforce cultural orthodoxy and to reinforce the power
of cultural leaders or spokespersons who suppress dissent. “‘Law in the domains of culture’
threatens to freeze cultural groups in the status quo and dramatically shift the balance of power
between members and leaders of cultural groups over the creation and control of cultural
meanings.”82 When the treatment of human genetic information is at issue, the risks are
apparent. Recognizing “control rights” by groups, in the name of “cultural preservation,” may
simply serve to stifle cultural evolution and dissenting voices about the profound and potentially
contested cultural, social, and medical issues that human genetics studies involve.
The recognition of the possibilities of repression of cultural dissent, false leadership, and
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other issues within groups that might assert genetic-control claims is obviously important.
However, we must also remember that attempted repression of cultural change and dissent is not
limited to the human groups that might assert genetic-control claims. All cultures – whether
ethnically, politically, historically, religiously, or otherwise defined – are subject to the same
evolutionary processes and the same desires on the parts of some to repress those processes.
There is as much reason to be concerned about such risks when evaluating the professed cultural
norms and positions of (for instance) traditional religious groups or local government leaders as
there is when evaluating the professed cultural norms and positions of groups that make geneticcontrol claims. Intellectual and cultural ferment is simply a part of the human condition. That
fact does not preclude our recognition of the claims of groups in other settings, and it should not
– of itself – preclude the recognition of the claims of groups in this.

(b) Conflict with Individual Choice

Another serious objection to group rights in the genetic-control context is embedded in
the general bias in Western jurisprudence against group rights with which we began. To the
extent that rights are conferred upon groups or other collectivities, they are taken from
individuals who are members of those groups. If we empower tribal governments, insular
religious-group leaders, indigenous-group spokespersons, and others, we may enhance the
autonomy of these groups, but it will be at the expense of the individual autonomy of their
members.
That group exercise of authoritative powers entails loss of individual autonomy is
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undeniable. If the United States Congress decides whether human cloning is permissible,
individuals are denied that choice. If a tribal government decides whether researchers shall be
welcome on a reservation, individuals in that tribe are denied that choice. That group power is
exercised in derogation of individual autonomy is tautologically true.
It is equally obvious, however, that we have no problem with governmental authority and
group rule in a myriad of contexts. Philosophical hand-wringing over the inevitable loss of
individual autonomy to group power is, thus, beside the point. In an organized society groups
will, in some circumstances, prevail. The question, thus, is not whether individual autonomy
should, in some idealized sense, be lost – but whether a particular group in a particular context
should be afforded this power.
Let us proceed, then, to the genuine question: whether there are reasons why individualgroup conflict in the genetic-control context is particularly troubling. The most potent argument
for individual control in this context is respect for the self-determination of patients.83 Since the
genetics field involves disease – its detection, prevention, and cure, it is argued that individuals
who are subject to those diseases have extremely strong moral claims to control in this field.
This is an important argument and must be carefully considered. It is, of course, possible
to question the idea of the individual that this argument assumes. Even in the disease detection,
prevention, and treatment context, the model of the supremacy of individual decisionmaking
may not be shared by the persons who belong to groups who are asserting genetic-control claims.
For individuals who are members of many societies, perspectives on the nature of disease, the
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subject-investigator relationship, and the doctor-patient relationship do not mirror the Western
(primarily American) idea of radical individualism.84 For persons in many cultures, the conflict
between individual personhood and group norms in the genetic-control context may be far less
than this objection supposes.
However, some conflict between individual desire for genetically related disease research
and group decisionmaking can be presumed to be inevitable. In these circumstances, we must
seriously ask: should collective determinations be binding upon individuals?
To analyze this question, we must distinguish the following situations:
•

Groups whose memberships derive from the voluntary associations of individuals.

•

Groups whose powers are governmental in nature.

•

Groups whose powers are not governmental, but whose memberships are
nonetheless involuntary or coerced on biological, practical, or other grounds.

If the situation involves a group of the first kind – i.e., a voluntary association of
individuals – the conflict will most likely resolve itself. Any individual who is a member of a
voluntary group, and who is unhappy with group decisions about genetic testing, use, or
patenting, can simply eschew the group’s authority and seek participation or (non-participation)
on terms and conditions of her own. A member of a cultural group, a religious group, or other
voluntary group who does not wish to participate in genetic studies, or who wishes to participate
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in studies that the group rejects, is free – on her own – to do so. There may be social or cultural
repercussions from this action; there may be individual hardships from group schism; there may
be diminished opportunities for participation, if others decline – but none of these are peculiar to,
or preventable by the denial of, the idea of group control.
If the situation involves a group of the second kind – i.e., a group with the powers of
government – we have the other extreme. In this situation, membership criteria and the group’s
authority are established by law. This being so, the question of where individual rights end, and
collective rights begin, has already been established. If the United States Congress forbids
embryonic stem cell research – if a tribal government forbids the reservation testing of its
members – those are the decisions of sovereignty. The fact that individual desires for research or
treatment may be thwarted does not negate the collective values and collective rights on which
these decisions are based. The idea that a “collective decision [in genetics studies] is not binding
on individual community members”85 is therefore true if membership in the group is voluntary or
other methods for individual exit exist. It is not true if the group is sovereign, and exercises
those sovereign powers.
It is groups of the third kind that present the most difficult cases: groups whose powers
are not governmental, but whose membership is nonetheless involuntary or coerced on
biological, practical, or other grounds. Examples might include racial or ethnic groups,
genetically linked family members, isolated populations whose contacts with researchers are
controlled by leaders, and so on. In these cases, we have neither the powers of sovereignty nor
the power of exit to answer the question. Rather, we must do so on other grounds.
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In my view, resolution of these cases is necessarily contextual and dependent upon the
strength of the competing interests involved. Of critical importance on the individual side is the
ethic of individual disease detection, prevention, or treatment, or “patient status,” with which our
consideration of individual-group conflict began. If the individual’s dissent is due to immediate
and tangible health concerns, it is difficult to imagine any group interest that could trump it.
Thus, for instance, a family-group member has a right to seek genetic testing despite the desires
of other family members for ignorance.86 Likewise, an indigenous group member would have a
right (in theory, at least) to seek genetically inspired treatment for disease, despite the objections
of her culture.
The balance of interests will shift as the connection between treatment of individual
disease and the genetic project becomes more and more attenuated. Where, for instance, the
genetic project is simply genetic sampling for anthropological research, or for possible discovery
of diseases or cures, we cannot assume that group interests must always yield to individual
desires. In each case, the strength of opposing interests must be considered. If the group fears
stigmatization through genetic testing, the size of the group, the social identifiability of members
of the group, and the social opprobrium attached to the genetically identified disease are
relevant. There is much greater danger of stigmatization when the group is small, its members
are readily identifiable, and the disease is devastating and incurable (e.g., the association of a
tribal group with schizophrenia) than there is when the group encompasses millions of
individuals, who are only generally identifiable, and the disease is common and curable (e.g., the
association of a particular segment of the general population with particular kinds of cancer).
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See Laurie, supra note 56, at 48.
31

Similarly, if the group interest is cultural in nature, different decisions will be justified if the
cultural impact is slight, or if it is a case of serious cultural challenge, erosion, or substantial
destruction.87
In short, the idea that the intrinsic merit of individual autonomy should preclude the
exercise of genetic control powers by groups is overly simplistic. There is no reflexive,
theoretical reason why individual decisionmaking should be favored in this context. Outcomes
must depend upon the nature of group and individual relations, and the strength of the competing
interests involved.

(c) “Common Heritage” Arguments

A final argument against group rights in the genetic-control context turns the theory of
group rights upon itself. According to this argument, there is nothing wrong with group rights;
indeed, utilitarian arguments (the “greatest good for the greatest number”), which implicitly
underlie claims for group rights in this context, are certainly correct. Rather, the problem is that
the applicable “group” is defined too narrowly. The “group” to whom rights should be afforded
is not an indigenous group, or a family group, or an ethnic group; it is all of humankind.
This is a kind of “nesting” argument, but with broader implications. Groups who assert
genetic control claims are obviously part of the larger human community. If members of those
groups have genetic characteristics that would benefit disease research or other scientific study,
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there is (in the view of these critics) no reason to confer control on the particular sub-group
involved. Their genetic materials – like all of the world’s resources – should be utilized in a way
to benefit all of humanity. To do less is to fail to recognize the common interests and needs of
all humankind.
“Common heritage” arguments of this kind have been made in all genetics research
projects.88 A famous example can be found in an early Human Genome Diversity Project
Summary Document, which described the “main value” of the project as “its enormous potential
for illuminating our understanding of human history and identity.” “There is a cultural
imperative for us to ... use the extraordinary scientific power that has been created through the
development of DNA technology ... for the benefit of all people ... .”89
This argument seems to advance a very simple challenge to the size of the net which we
shall cast. For instance, in the famous case of Hagahai DNA sampling (and patenting),90 the
question thus seems to be: who should be our “group of concern,” a Hagahai tribe of 293
members or all of those who will benefit from treatment of leukemia and degenerative
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neurological diseases – potentially, all of humankind?91 Put this way, as a numbers game, the
answer appears to be obvious.
However, we must think again. The idea that the interests of the many will always trump
the interests of the few in this field is obviously untrue. Disease research and cures are
undoubtedly critical human interests; yet they do not allow us to force individuals to undergo
genetic testing, or allow us to conscript individuals for medical research. There are obviously
limits to the use of a purely “utilitarian” calculus, in this sense, in the achievement of public
health. Moreover, just as we cannot assume the supremacy of the many over the individual, so
we cannot assume the supremacy of the many over smaller groups.
“Common heritage” arguments are, thus, a way to (falsely) assume the superiority of
numbers. They are also a way to preclude, in a single stroke, the assertion of any interests by the
opposing, smaller group. As Laurie Whitt has bitterly noted in a related context, “[t]he key first
step is to declare that these indigenous genetic resources belong to everyone. As the ‘common
heritage of mankind’ ..., they are ‘not owned by any one people and are quite literaly a part of
our human heritage from the past.’ Thus, they are ‘looked upon as a public good for which no
payment is necessary or appropriate’”, and are ready for conversion into private property by
those who would exploit them.92 “Common heritage” arguments are declarations of ownership,
control, and exclusivity of interests. There must be more than a simple, unilateral declaration of
appropriation to justify this – as opposed to some other – allocation of power.
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IV. Conclusion

The idea of group rights is generally regarded with deep skepticism in contemporary
Western jurisprudence. It is generally assumed by liberal democratic governments and their
supporters that moral value is rooted in the well-being of individuals, and that rights are a way to
enforce this truth.
This general skepticism has pervaded the responses of many researchers and
policymakers to the claims by groups to control over the collection, testing, and disposition of
the genetic materials of their members. Because of a jurisprudential and ethical model which is
rooted in individual concerns, the idea of group rights in this context has an aura of illegitimacy
at the outset. We begin with a model that allows – only with great effort – the imagining of
rights for groups.
It has been my contention in this essay that objections to group rights in this context are
more a product of this model’s unexamined bias than considered reasons. If one accepts the
moral value of distinctively collective interests, there is no theoretical barrier to the recognition
of morally grounded group rights. As a practical matter, group rights are cognizable in law, if
lawmakers so desire. Indeed, lawmakers have so desired, in the recognition of rights of local
and state governments, Indian tribes, families, religious and ethnic groups, and others. Evaluated
analytically, none of the structural objections to group genetic-control rights (such as group
affiliation, group agency, or “nesting”) nor the substantive objections (the alleged
inappropriateness of “demes” or social groups as rights-carriers, the unjustified derogation of
individual autonomy that group rights involve, or the needs of our “common heritage”) raised is
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as widely preclusive, or as unique to these group claims, as opponents commonly argue. There
may be uncertainties in group genetic-control claims; there may be societal costs involved in
their granting; but those uncertainties and costs are, in truth, no different in kind from those that
we readily decide to tolerate or incur in other contexts.
Claims by groups to genetic control might be claims that we decide to honor or not, in
view of all of the circumstances. However, those decisions should be informed and reasoned
ones, and not simply the products of unexamined bias.
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